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Introduction
	Perhaps the most immediate ethical concerns about nanotechnology revolve around the potential risks that nanomaterials pose to public health and the environment. Because of their small size (less than 100 nm in one or more dimensions), they have the potential to move through cells, tissues, and even the blood-brain barrier more easily than larger particles of the same substances. Moreover, their high surface-area-to-mass ratio tends to increase their reactivity (Oberdörster et al. 2005; Royal Society 2004). Particular nanomaterials may also be especially problematic because of their shape (such as carbon nanotubes that resemble asbestos fibers) or because of their tendency to carry other toxic substances along with them (Balbus et al. 2007; Poland et al. 2008).
 	Ethicists and policy makers have previously spent a good deal of effort considering how to make societal decisions in response to public- and environmental-health risks like those posed by nanomaterials. Many of these discussions have focused on the strengths and weaknesses of decision-making approaches such as risk-cost-benefit-analysis or the precautionary principle (Raffensperger and Tickner 1999; Shrader-Frechette 1985, 1991; Sunstein 2005). Important questions about these approaches include deciding how to address the inequitable societal distributions of risks and benefits (e.g., Schmidtz 2001, Shrader-Frechette 1985), how to ensure due process and informed consent when imposing health risks (e.g., Shrader-Frechette 1993), and how to identify appropriate margins of safety when regulating hazards that are poorly understood (e.g., von Schomberg 2006). In this paper, I want to explore how these sorts of ethical and societal value judgments about responding to nanotechnology’s environmental health and safety risks arise not only in the public-policy domain but also “upstream,” in the performance of scientific research.
	The next section examines previous scholarship on the ways that ethical and societal value judgments permeate scientific research. It focuses especially on the notion that particular forms of research can be more “precautionary” than others, in the sense that they tend to facilitate the identification and prevention of environmental or public health threats. Section 3 turns to a specific case study, nanotoxicology, and shows how ethical and societal values could influence at least four aspects of this research: 

(1)	the nanomaterials studied; 
(2)	the biological models used to investigate them; 
(3)	the effects examined; and 
(4)	the standards of evidence required for drawing conclusions. 

	Finally, Section 4 proposes some mechanisms for integrating more careful ethical reflection into these “upstream,” value-laden decisions that pervade research on nanotechnology as well as other policy-relevant areas of science. 
Value Judgments in Scientific Research
The basic notion that scientific research incorporates a range of value judgments is not new. It is widely accepted that scientists incorporate “epistemic” or “cognitive” values in their judgments about what hypotheses, models, or theories to accept (Kuhn 1977; McMullin 1983). For example, researchers have to consider which hypotheses best display valued characteristics like explanatory power, coherence with other scientific theories, and predictive success. The distinguishing feature of these epistemic values is that they promote the truth-seeking goals of science (Steel 2010). It is somewhat less clear how various “non-epistemic” values (e.g., personal, social, ethical, religious, or political considerations) should play a role in scientific practice. There are some aspects of science where the influence of these values seems appropriate. For example, few would doubt that large-scale choices about how to allocate public research funding (e.g., choosing to study cancer treatments as opposed to space exploration) should be subject to the social values of taxpayers. Similarly, choices about how to formulate public policy in response to scientific information (e.g., deciding whether the risks of a nuclear accident are small enough to justify building nuclear power plants) should also be subject to ethical and societal value judgments. 
	It is much less obvious that these sorts of non-epistemic values should play a role in the very “heart” of science, when scientists make decisions about whether to accept or reject particular hypotheses. Nevertheless, many philosophers of science have argued that even these sorts of decisions should sometimes be influenced by non-epistemic considerations (see e.g., Douglas 2009; Elliott 2011; Longino 1990). Section 4 will return to these difficult normative issues about how these values ought to play a role in science and how to adjudicate among competing values. The remainder of the present section, as well as Section 3, focuses on the somewhat simpler but still important descriptive question of how scientific research does in fact incorporate or privilege some non-epistemic values over others. Because this is a vast topic (see e.g., Elliott 2011; Longino 1990), the present paper focuses specifically on values concerning how aggressively we should try to identify and prevent threats to public and environmental health. 
	The remainder of this section examines work by advocates of the precautionary principle who have previously highlighted ways in which scientific practice is implicitly permeated by non-epistemic values. Specifically, these thinkers argue that choices about what questions to pursue and what research methodologies to employ can influence our ability to identify and prevent threats to environmental and public health. The following statement from the 1992 Rio Declaration is typical of many interpretations of the precautionary principle: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (quoted in Sunstein 2005, 18). This relatively narrow statement of the principle focuses on the realm of public policy, clarifying the amount of evidence required for justifying regulatory actions. However, those who espouse broader interpretations of the precautionary principle sometimes argue that it calls for wide-ranging changes in how society approaches environmental health and safety threats, and one of these changes is to perform scientific research differently (Tickner 2005). 
	One important statement of this view comes from Katherine Barrett and Carolyn Raffensperger (1999). They contrast dominant contemporary approaches to scientific research, which they call “mechanistic science,” with the sorts of “precautionary science” that would facilitate policy actions in accordance with the precautionary principle.​[1]​ According to Barrett and Raffensperger, precautionary science would accept a wider variety of data (including more qualitative and citizen-generated data), focus on a wider range of harms (including various disruptions to ecological and social systems), and emphasize more complicated and multidisciplinary research projects that are better for addressing real-life concerns. The goal of all these changes would be to lessen the frequency with which scientists make false negative claims about environmental health and safety threats (i.e., cases where scientists falsely claim that a substance or activity is not harmful when it actually poses a hazard). Barrett and Raffensperger suggest that, whereas scientific research practices may appear to be value-free, there are a variety of subtle ways in which they presently support the values of those who want to minimize false positive errors rather than false negatives. In other words, current practices tend to protect producers from claims that their products are harmful. 
	David Kriebel and his colleagues (2001) also argue that scientific research could be altered to facilitate precautionary public policy. One of their suggestions is to place more emphasis on studying interactions between various potentially hazardous causal factors rather than studying them independently. (For example, some substances that might not be particularly toxic on their own could be quite harmful in combination; see Biello 2006.) Another of their suggestions is to present scientific findings in a manner that provides a more complete sense of the uncertainty associated with the results. Like Barrett and Raffensperger, they also encourage multidisciplinary work to address pressing social problems that might otherwise be set aside because of the difficulty of addressing them within individual disciplinary approaches. Finally, they agree that current scientific practices are designed preferentially to minimize false positive rather than false negative errors, which does not accord well with the precautionary principle. 
	Many of these suggestions are summed up in an issue of Human and Ecological Risk Assessment (Vol. 1, No. 1, 2005) that focused on the implications of the precautionary principle for environmental health research. Philippe Grandjean introduced the journal issue with the following clarifications:
	“The PP [i.e., precautionary principle] has … been misunderstood as anti-science. However, what has been called for [by advocates of the PP] is not an embargo of science, but rather the initiation of ‘new science.’… The ways in which science can support PP-based decisions is … likely to differ from the science that has supported traditional risk assessment.” (Grandjean 2005, 14) 
	Articles throughout the issue emphasized the importance of altering traditional practices that asymmetrically favor false negative errors over false positives. They also encouraged scientists to place less emphasis on replicating findings and hammering out highly detailed understandings of specific hazards; instead, they encouraged researchers to perform strategic studies that would be of most help to societal decision makers. Along these lines, they also encouraged scientists to consider how best to present their results in order to promote fruitful interactions with the stakeholders who would use their findings.
	Finally, although philosopher of science Hugh Lacey (1999) does not explicitly use the label of “precautionary science,” he has very perceptively argued for different approaches to scientific research. According to Lacey, contemporary scientific practice is far from neutral with respect to different value systems, because it focuses on employing “materialist strategies.” He claims that scientific “strategies” constitute informal guidelines for how research is to be done. They establish constraints on the kinds of theories entertained, they select the kinds of data to be sought, and they guide the choice of categories used in describing scientific findings. Lacey (2002) claims that materialist strategies focus on generating quantitative descriptions of underlying structure, process, and law, while abstracting from social arrangements and values. Unfortunately, in policy-relevant fields, these strategies can end up subtly privileging some societal values over others. Lacey focuses especially on agricultural research, suggesting that materialist research strategies often focus solely on increasing crop yields under “optimal” conditions. He argues that such approaches fail to consider the broader social and environmental consequences of heavily employing fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation. He suggests that alternative, “agroecological” research strategies would promote the study of more complicated questions, such as “How can we produce wheat so that all the people in a given region will gain access to a well-balanced diet in a context that enhances local agency and sustains the environment?” (1999, 194).
Value Judgments in Nanotoxicology
We have seen that some proponents of the precautionary principle have identified a number of ways in which scientific research can subtly support some ethical and societal values over others, especially regarding the identification and prevention of environmental and public health threats.​[2]​ I now want to consider four aspects of nanotoxicology research (materials studied, biological models, effects examined, and standards of evidence) and examine how one can provide a similar analysis of the values implicit in this field. Nanotoxicology has arisen as part of the broader discipline of toxicology in an effort to characterize the potentially unique environmental and public health threats associated with nanomaterials. Because the properties of these materials often differ from those of larger particles of the same substances, existing toxicological knowledge may be of limited help in predicting risks associated with nanotechnology (Oberdörster et al. 2005). Moreover, there are a huge number of variables that could potentially alter the toxicity of nanomaterials, including their dose concentration (measured in surface area or the number of particles and not just in mass), size distribution, shape, composition, surface chemistry, surface contamination, surface charge, crystal structure, particle physicochemical structure, agglomeration state, porosity, method of production, preparation process, heterogeneity, and prior storage of the material (Oberdörster et al. 2005). In an effort to alleviate this confusion, researchers are recommending broad screening strategies, in which nanomaterials with a range of properties are tested for toxicity using various in vitro, in vivo, and even in silico systems.​[3]​
	Materials Studied 
One value-laden set of questions that immediately arises when developing a screening strategy concerns the types of nanomaterials to prioritize for research, given the extraordinary range of variables that could be investigated. One example of these questions comes from my personal experiences with a group of scientists who were developing a grant proposal to study the environmental effects of nanotechnology. They were inclined to study various metal- and carbon-based nanomaterials, and they were debating whether to include ceramics (i.e., metal-oxides) as well. On one hand, some of them noted that consulting firms were predicting that ceramics were likely to become very widely used nanomaterials in the future. On the other hand, others expressed the concern that it is more difficult to obtain replicable toxicological findings about ceramics, in part because they react with light to form a range of different structures and because they agglomerate into particles of varying sizes.
	The scientists’ discussion about the merits of studying ceramic nanoparticles highlights the subtle ethical and societal value judgments that are often implicit in the choice of research projects. In the ceramics case, researchers had to balance the desire to gather socially relevant information (which would count in favor of studying widely used materials like ceramics) against the scientific imperative of obtaining high-quality, replicable, publishable data. A second example of decisions about which nanomaterials to study highlights many of the same trade-offs. Toxicologists in general, and nanotoxicologists in particular, have noted that studying the biological effects of samples that contain fairly homogeneous particles of a single material may not generate reliable estimates of the real-life effects produced by mixtures of very heterogeneous substances (Eggen et al. 2004). It is understandable that toxicologists have often focused on studying single materials. They tend to yield reliable, replicable data that is publishable and that can be used for developing structure-activity models to predict the toxicity of new chemicals. Nevertheless, those who advocate studying mixtures emphasize that regulators should also try to understand the synergistic effects produced by the wide variety of toxic agents to which biological organisms are generally exposed (Balbus et al. 2007, 1657; Biello 2006). 
	To illustrate the value of studying nanoparticle mixtures, consider an excellent study that examined how single-walled carbon nanotubes affected tiny estuarine crustaceans called copepods (Templeton et al. 2006). The researchers studied not only purified samples of the nanotubes but also “as prepared” samples, which included both the nanotubes and a range of byproducts associated with the manufacturing process. Strikingly, the nanotubes themselves were much less toxic than the byproducts. This study highlights the fact that efforts to study purified substances can be very misleading when predicting toxicity associated with real-life exposures. Unfortunately, it takes a good deal of additional effort to purify various components of a mixture and to test them individually. In the case of this study, for example, the researchers studied the nanotubes by themselves, the “as prepared” mixture as a whole, and a subset of the mixture that contained particular byproducts of the manufacturing process. It is not always feasible to engage in such detailed investigations, and even this study was not able to identify individual byproducts that were most responsible for the toxicity.
	Biological Models 
Another set of value-laden questions related to the development of screening strategies involves the choice of biological models used for studying toxic effects. Consider, for example, choices about which fish species to use for studying aquatic effects of nanoparticles. Researchers have to decide whether to study biological models that are more ecologically useful, such as large-mouth bass, or whether to employ those that are better understood scientifically, such as zebrafish (Tara Sabo-Attwood, personal communication). If one’s goal were to obtain information that is most relevant to ecosystems in the U.S., large-mouth bass would be a much better model to study, given that zebrafish are native only to the southeastern Himalayas. Nevertheless, reviewers for grant proposals tend to be more sympathetic to studies of zebrafish, because it is an important model organism in biomedical and toxicological research (e.g., Hill et al. 2005). Because so much is known about its genetics and development, it may be easier to develop detailed understanding of the biological mechanisms responsible for toxicity by studying zebrafish.
	Another important issue associated with choosing biological models is to decide how sensitive an organism to use. Toxicologists are well aware that some biological species, as well as specific strains or subspecies, are more likely to exhibit toxic effects to particular substances than others (see e.g., Boverhof et al. 2006). For example, rats appear to be more sensitive than mice to nanoparticles of carbon black, diesel engine exhaust, and titanium dioxide (Heinrich et al. 1995). The stage of an organism’s life cycle can also make a difference; one recent study showed that adult Drosophila were harmed by carbon nanomaterials in ways that the larvae were not (Liu et al. 2009). Industry groups have sometimes taken advantage of these differences between biological models in order to design studies with “tough” animal strains that are unlikely to exhibit toxic responses (see e.g., vom Saal and Hughes 2005). Value-laden decisions about the choice of organisms can also arise in a more benign fashion. Some biological models are more widely discussed in the scientific literature or are easier to study in a laboratory environment than others (Hill et al. 2005). Therefore, researchers occasionally have to weigh considerations of scientific popularity and convenience against other values, such as the desire to use appropriately sensitive models or ethical concerns about animal experimentation.​[4]​
	Effects Examined
The specific biological effects and endpoints to be studied constitute another important set of value-laden decisions for nanotoxicologists. Many scientists have worried that short-term studies of acute toxicity (i.e., death) are likely to miss a wide range of important long-term, chronic toxic effects (Calow and Forbes 2003; Eggen et al. 2004). These worries become even more serious when researchers try to estimate the long-term effects of a pollutant on an entire ecosystem based on its acute effects in a limited number of species. These problems were vividly highlighted by Thomas Chandler and his colleagues (2004) in a study of the pesticide fipronil, which is widely used for insect control both in residential areas and on golf courses. Estimates of its aquatic effects based on its lethality in fish had previously yielded the conclusion that its risks at realistic water concentrations were “small” (Chandler et al. 2004, 6413). In contrast, Chandler’s group studied the effects of the pesticide and its degradation products at the same concentrations but on a much wider variety of endpoints (survival, development rates, sex ratio change, fertility, fecundity, and hatching success) for several generations in the life cycle of a small aquatic crustacean. They concluded that the pesticide “would cause almost total reproductive failure” (2004, 6413) in their test organism, thereby potentially causing significant problems in the ecosystem as a whole.
	Some nanotechnology experts have been quite sensitive to this potential for wide variations in risk assessments for a single substance, depending on the effects examined. For example, an expert working group led by Gunter Oberdörster (2005) recently proposed a screening strategy for identifying hazards from nanoparticles. They called for in vitro studies of a very wide range of targets, including numerous cell types within the lung, multiple skin assays, and numerous organs and organ systems (e.g., spleen, liver, blood, nervous system, heart, and kidney). Moreover, they worried about the potential for nanomaterials to move throughout the body, producing unforeseen effects remote from the source of exposure. To alleviate this problem, they called for in vivo studies of nanoparticles, focusing especially on the reproductive system and on compromised animal models (which might display evidence of otherwise unnoticed effects). They also called for genomic and proteomic analyses to highlight potential effects that might not be obvious based on other experimental methods. The problem, of course, is that the extensive battery of studies recommended by Oberdörster and his colleagues is costly and time-consuming. Therefore, researchers are generally forced to make difficult choices about which effects are most important to investigate in the near term.
	Standards of Evidence
As we have seen throughout Section 3, there are an extraordinary number of variables that could be relevant to studying nanoparticle toxicity. To perform a systematic investigation of all the nanomaterials envisioned for consumer use, taking into account the wide range of biological effects that they could produce, would be extremely difficult. Therefore, nanotoxicologists are calling for the development of modeling techniques that can assist in predicting the toxicity of materials before requiring extensive in vitro or in vivo tests (Balbus et al. 2007; Barnard 2009; Oberdörster et al. 2005). The crucial difficulty with this strategy is that, even if somewhat reliable models could be developed, there would still be very difficult decisions at the interface of science and policy about how to respond to the resulting findings. 
Advocates of “precautionary” approaches to public policy have long argued that regulators could streamline their systems if they would give more credence to quicker, inexpensive, less-reliable approaches to predicting toxicity (see e.g., Cranor 1999; Wahlström 1999). For example, chemicals could be considered “guilty until proven innocent” if they failed the sorts of structure-activity predictions that nanotoxicologists are trying to develop. Carl Cranor (1995) has argued that it would frequently make economic sense to expedite risk-assessment procedures with quicker estimates of toxicity, because the environmental and public-health costs of leaving harmful products on the market (while waiting for the results of detailed toxicity studies) are quite significant. Nevertheless, many industry groups have insisted that regulatory actions must be based on very detailed scientific information, and this strategy has often assisted them in slowing the regulatory process to a near-stand-still (Fagin et al. 1999; Michaels 2008). 
	The field of nanotoxicology exhibits a number of other interesting cases where scientists and policy makers need to decide how much evidence to require for drawing conclusions and formulating regulations. Nanotoxicologists have been worried for some time that, because of their similar shape to asbestos fibers, carbon nanotubes might have some of the same carcinogenic properties as asbestos. Preliminary research has shown that nanotubes do appear to produce pre-cancerous lesions similar in kind to those produced by asbestos fibers (Poland et al. 2009). The question faced by scientists and regulators is how much evidence to demand before concluding that particular kinds of nanotubes are carcinogenic and should be regulated. Another important question concerns the amount of evidence needed for regulatory regimes to start differentiating nanoparticles of common substances (e.g., titanium dioxide, silver, or gold) from bulk quantities of those materials. While numerous commentators have argued that nanoparticles are unlikely to behave in the same manner as bulk materials, most countries have been very slow to take account of this fact (Bowman and van Calster 2008, p. 8; Royal Society 2004). 
	One might be tempted to consider these questions about standards of evidence to be primarily a policy issue rather than a scientific one. Nevertheless, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle these sorts of policy considerations from scientific practice. When researchers choose models, characterize data, and interpret their results, they are frequently forced to make methodological decisions that influence their likelihood of drawing false positive or false negative conclusions about environmental or public health threats (Douglas 2000; Elliott 2011). Therefore, scientists engaged in policy-relevant research cannot entirely avoid ethical and societal value judgments about what standards of evidence to demand (and therefore how to characterize data and interpret results). In some cases, it may be possible for scientists to provide relatively uninterpreted data to policy makers and allow them to make the value-laden decisions about what conclusions should be drawn on the basis of the available evidence. In many other cases, however, it is impractical for scientists to avoid these value-laden decisions entirely (Cranor 1990).
	Integrating Ethical and Societal Values in Nanotoxicology
The previous section showed that the field of nanotoxicology, like other areas of policy-relevant science, is permeated with implicit value judgments. In the case of nanotoxicology, at least four judgments are important to consider:

(1)	the nanomaterials studied;
(2)	the biological models used to investigate them;
(3)	the effects examined; and
(4)	the standards of evidence required for drawing conclusions. 

	In some cases, the social ramifications of making one choice rather than another are not particularly clear. In other cases, however, one can foresee that some decisions (e.g., choosing to study a particularly sensitive biological model) will assist in identifying and preventing threats to public and environmental health, whereas others will promote the economic success of regulated industries. Therefore, the normative questions that we set aside in Section 2 reemerge; namely, should we intentionally allow ethical and societal values to play a role in these four decisions, and, if so, how? 
	For many of these judgments, it is uncontroversial that ethical and societal concerns have a legitimate role to play. It is widely accepted that non-epistemic values are relevant to deciding what research projects to pursue, including questions like which materials to study, what biological models to use, and which effects to investigate (Elliott and McKaughan 2009; Longino 1990). Choosing standards of evidence is more complicated, because it straddles “policy” issues about how to act in response to limited information as well as “scientific” questions about what conclusions to draw on the basis of incomplete evidence. Although this is a complicated issue, a number of authors have argued that scientists should not ignore the societal consequences of choosing standards of evidence (see e.g., Douglas 2009; Elliott 2011; Shrader-Frechette 1994). One can argue for this conclusion either by appealing to special responsibilities that scientists have to society by virtue of their professional role, or by arguing that scientists are moral agents who have the same responsibilities as everyone else to avoid negligently causing harm to those around them. 
	Let us assume for the purposes of this paper that ethical and societal considerations should be intentionally brought to bear on all four research choices discussed in Section 3. The next question is how to incorporate and weigh various values and concerns. While this is a difficult and multi-faceted problem, I would like to briefly explore three proposals: 

(1)	providing strategic training in research ethics for scientists working in policy-relevant fields; 
(2)	carefully diagnosing appropriate mechanisms for deliberation between scientists and stakeholders; and 
(3)	supplying significant government funding and leadership for research in nanotoxicology. 

	The motivation for the first proposal is that many of the value-laden judgments associated with policy-relevant science are deeply embedded in the practice of research. Therefore, it would be highly impractical for policy makers or other stakeholders to be constantly scrutinizing the details of scientists’ research choices. If researchers are to be given a significant degree of autonomy to make these decisions for themselves, however, it is important to equip them with awareness and sensitivity of the societal ramifications of the decisions that they are making (Douglas 2003). Unfortunately, research ethics curricula have frequently focused on fairly narrow issues that have little do with scientists’ social responsibilities (Pimple 2002).
	In the field of nanotechnology, however, there have been a number of creative initiatives to improve research-ethics training for scientists, especially at the major Centers for Nanotechnology in Society (CNS) funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF) at Arizona State University (ASU) and the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB). ASU, for example, has instituted a PhD Plus Program for graduate students in science and engineering. As part of this program, the students work with a special faculty mentor to add a chapter to their dissertation that addresses political, societal, or ethical dimensions of their work.​[5]​ CNS-ASU has also created a two-week immersion seminar in Washington, D.C., that allows graduate students to learn about the societal and policy dimensions of their chosen fields. Finally, Erik Fisher, Joan McGregor, and Jameson Wetmore have reported on a variety of efforts (at ASU as well as other universities) to bring humanists and social scientists into close contact with natural scientists over extended periods of time, with the goal of developing constructive dialogues about the scientific work being performed (Fisher 2007; McGregor and Wetmore 2009). Along these lines, CNS-UCSB has been offering graduate fellowships for students in the sciences, engineering, humanities, and social sciences so that they can work together and with appropriate faculty to analyze the social dimensions of scientific work.​[6]​ Ideally, these programs will provide scientists with greater sensitivity both to societal concerns and to the ways in which those values intersect with their own work.
	Despite the value of these research-ethics strategies, there are still normative, substantive, and instrumental reasons for attempting, under at least some circumstances, to broaden the range of people involved in making the value-laden judgments associated with scientific research (Fiorino 1990). To put the point briefly, it is doubtful that nanotoxicology researchers have the political legitimacy to decide all by themselves how to handle the range of decisions that impinge on their work, and other stakeholders can often make helpful suggestions for handling these difficult issues. Fortunately, there are now numerous precedents for using deliberative approaches to address such issues (see e.g., NRC 1996; Kleinman 2000). Formats can range from National Academy of Science (NAS) or Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) panels that consist primarily of scientists all the way to approaches that are geared primarily toward the public, such as citizen juries or consensus conferences. Some nanotoxicology experts already appear to be sympathetic to efforts along these lines, insofar as they have called for “great care and deliberation” in choosing a representative set of nanomaterials that will receive extensive characterization and toxicity testing (Balbus et al. 2007, 1657). 
	It is very important that the deliberative formats for making these sorts of decisions be chosen carefully. Existing research suggests that broadly based deliberation can, under the right circumstances, alleviate conflict and improve the quality of environmental decisions (see e.g., Beierle 2002; Fischer 1993; NRC 1996). Unfortunately, deliberative approaches can also sometimes result in increased cost, wasted time, poor decisions, and even the creation of increased hostility among stakeholders (see e.g., Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Kleinman 2005). What is needed, then, is a careful “diagnosis” of the sorts of deliberative formats that are likely to be most effective and appropriate in particular contexts (Elliott 2008; NRC 1996). 
It is encouraging to see that there have already been a number of efforts to experiment with creative approaches for incorporating members of the public in broadly based deliberations about nanotechnology. These include the National Citizens’ Technology Forum organized by CNS-ASU, a variety of innovative exercises funded by the European Commission under the auspices of the DEEPEN project (Deepening Ethical Engagement and Participation with Emerging Nanotechnologies), and a set of nanodialogues organized by the UK think tank Demos.​[7]​ Sometimes, critics worry that deliberative forums like these operate at overly high levels of abstraction and have a fairly limited actual influence on decision making (Guston 1999). Focusing on some of the concrete questions identified in this paper (about materials, biological models, effects, and standards of evidence) might help to alleviate these concerns about deliberative forums. 
	A third recommendation for integrating ethical and societal concerns into the value-laden judgments associated with nanotoxicology is to ensure that government bodies provide adequate organization and funding for this area of research. This is particularly important, because privately funded research in the environmental and public-health domains is often strategically designed to protect industry interests, without including transparent discussions of the value-laden decisions being made. There is now an extensive body of work cataloging strategies that interest groups routinely employ in order to challenge environmental health and safety regulations (see e.g., Elliott 2011; Fagin et al. 1999; McGarity and Wagner 2008; Michaels 2008). To take just one prominent example, a review found that 94 out of 104 published government-funded studies concerning the endocrine disruptor bisphenol A (BPA) found that it had significant biological effects at doses of less than 50 mg/kg/day (vom Saal and Hughes 2005). In contrast, 0 out of 11 industry-funded studies found biological effects at the same dose levels. According to the review, these results could be attributed to questionable features of the industry study designs, such as using an insensitive strain of animals and examining inappropriate endpoints. 
	In the conclusion to an NSF-funded project that evaluated oversight models for nanotechnology, a group at the University of Minnesota argued that these sorts of financial conflicts of interest in nanotechnology safety testing could perhaps be addressed through a two-pronged strategy of developing standardized research procedures and then vetting data through a peer-review process (Ramachandran et al. 2011, p. 1361). Unfortunately, past experience with drug- and pesticide-safety testing indicates that this approach still leaves room for a great deal of abuse (Elliott and Volz 2012). Instead, a growing chorus of scholars is insisting that governments or other relatively independent sources must provide more funding on policy-relevant research topics like nanotechnology risks, and industry funding for chemical safety tests should ideally be funneled through an independent agency (e.g., Angell 2004; APHA 2003; Krimsky 2003; Shrader-Frechette 2007a, 2007b; Volz and Elliott 2012).​[8]​ 
	Unfortunately, the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) has come under fire for failing in this regard. According to a report by the U.S. National Research Council (NRC), recent plans for funding environmental health and safety research on nanomaterials amount “to an ad hoc collection of research priorities” from the 25 federal agencies associated with the NNI (Service 2008, 1779). Andrew Maynard, the Chief Science Advisor for the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, has also criticized the NNI for failing to fund environmental health and safety research adequately. While the NNI claims to be putting about 5% of its nanotechnology research budget into environmental health and safety studies, Maynard claims that only about one-fifth of this funding is on highly relevant risk research (Maynard 2008, 11). The NRC report calls for the NNI to develop “an overall vision and a plan for how to get there and to come up with the money to do so” (Service 2008, 1779). On this point, the three recommendations discussed in this section converge. We need socially- and ethically-sensitive scientists, deliberating among themselves and with appropriate stakeholders, to decide how to make the value-laden decisions involved in nanotoxicology research. This should occur both at the general level of developing a vision for funding environmental health and safety research in government agencies and at the more detailed level of choosing strategic research projects that help to fulfill that vision. 
Conclusion
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^1	  I should emphasize that, while Barrett and Raffensperger do an admirable job of highlighting the implicit value judgments that can permeate scientific research, their proposal of a sharp distinction between “mechanistic science” and “precautionary science” is questionable. Particular research practices can arguably be classified as precautionary only relative to a particular context (including, for example, the threats that are under consideration, the preventive actions being considered in response to the threats, and an alternative set of research practices that are less precautionary). 
^2	  It is important to recognize that advocates of the precautionary principle are by no means the only thinkers who have studied how scientific practices can privilege some ethical or societal values over others. I have focused on this particular group of thinkers because they have done a good job of highlighting the value-ladenness of scientific research and because their concerns apply well to nanotoxicology.
^3	  It is worth emphasizing that even decisions about whether to emphasize in vitro, in vivo, or in silico experimental systems involve a wide range of value judgments about how to prioritize considerations like the speed of research, avoidance of false positive and false negative errors, expense, and animal welfare.
^4	  Regarding the sensitivity of biological models, Tom Chandler (personal communication) provides a good example. He notes that daphnia and copepods are both small crustaceans that are used for studying the effects of environmental toxicants. Daphnia have been used more frequently, in part because they have generally been more convenient to study and to grow in the laboratory. Nevertheless, copepods tend to be more sensitive to some toxicants. Regarding the ethics of animal experimentation, Lafollette and Shanks (1997) provide an excellent overview of the issues. In some cases, computer modeling and bioinformatics may enable researchers to identify potential threats more quickly and with less harm to animal welfare than by using traditional in vivo approaches. 
^5	  For more information about this program, see http://www.cspo.org/outreach/phdplus/; last accessed on August 19, 2009.
^6	  For more information, see http://www.cns.ucsb.edu/education/; last accessed on August 19, 2009.
^7	  For more information about the National Citizens’ Technology Forum, see Philbrick and Barandiaran 2009. The final report for the DEEPEN project is available at http://www.geography.dur.ac.uk/projects/deepen/NewsandEvents/tabid/2903/Default.aspx (last accessed on March 5, 2010), and more information about the Demos project and its nanodialogues is available at n http://www.demos.co.uk/ (last accessed on March 5, 2010). 
^8	  Admittedly, government agencies are also influenced by a wide range of values and concerns. The point of promoting government funding is not to remove all value influences from scientific research but rather to counteract the radical, egregious biases associated with much industry-funded research (see McGarity and Wagner 2008; Michaels 2008).
